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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
EVIDENCE-Medical Treatises To Be Admitted as Direct 
Evidence in Wisconsin-Lewandowski v. 
Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co.* 
Defendant's attorney in a personal injury action sought on cross-
examination to impeach plaintiff's physician regarding his deter-
mination of the degree of plaintiff's disability by referring to the 
medical standards set forth in the American Medical Association's 
Guide to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment-The Extrem-
ities and Back.1 Pointing to the physician's testimony that he had 
not relied on the Guide in making his evaluation, the trial court 
sustained plaintiff's objection that such cross-examination was not 
permissible. On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that 
the trial court was correct in sustaining the objection in accordance 
with the established rule that it is not permissible to cross-examine 
with respect to a medical treatise on which the witness did not 
specifically rely in giving his direct testimony.2 However, the court 
ruled prospectively that such cross-examination would be permitted, 
and, in addition, that medical treatises recognized by the medical 
profession as authoritative could be admitted as independent evi-
dence "to prove the truth of a matter stated therein." 
In announcing its new rule, Wisconsin joined Alabama as appar-
ently the only states which, in the absence of expr~ !.tatutory 
authority, permit the introduction of medical treatises as
1 
~rmative 
substantive evidence.3 With the exception of states which deal with 
• 33 Wis. 2d 69, 146 N.W.2d 505 (1966) (hereinafter cited as principal case; page 
cites are to the regional reporter]. 
1. J.A.M.A. (special edition Feb. 15, 1958) [hereinafter referred to as the Guide]. 
The Guide consists of disability percentage tables based on objectively determined 
measurements of restriction of motion. 
Plaintiff suffered a rupture of two cervical discs, requiring ankylosis or surgical 
fusion of the two spinal vertebrae. Plaintiff's physician testified that the resulting 
disability involved 20% of the spine and 10% of the body, whereas defendant's witness 
estimated disability at 10 and 5% respectively. The Guide, however, sets only 3 to 7% 
spinal impairment and 2 to 4% bodily impairment as the result of ankylosis of any 
two cervical vertebrae. Guide 89, 103. 
2. Prior to the principal case, the "Wisconsin rule was that medical texts were 
inadmissible as independent direct evidence and, for purposes of cross-examination, 
could be used only to test the qualifications of a medical witness or to impeach a 
witness who had based llis opinion on that particular treatise. Zoldoske v. State, 82 
Wis. 580, 52 N.W. 778 (1892); City of Ripon v. Bittel, 30 Wis. 614 (1872). See note 
8 infra. 
3. Alabama first enunciated its rule that "medical authors, whose books are ad-
mitted or proven to be standard works with that profession, ought to be received in. 
evidence" in Stoudenmeier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558, 567 (1857) (treatise on venereal 
disease admitted to dispute local expert's testimony that the disease could be trans-
mitted by ordinary personal contact). Over eighty years later, the same court said 
"(w]e have not found the ends of justice defeated by our rule, nor the difficulties of 
its application very great." City of Dothan v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 607, 188 S. 264, 
[ 183] 
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the matter in statutory provisions, 4 the remaining jurisdictions, 
state and federal, follow the rule that medical treatises, being "hear-
say,"5 are not admissible as direct evidence "to prove the truth of 
the matter stated therein."6 Learned treatises in such fields as mathe-
266-67 (1939); accord, Smarr v. State, 260 Ala. 30, 68 S.2d 6 (1953). Alabama has since 
codified its rule. See note 4 infra. Dean Wigmore, writing in 1940, discerned possible 
acceptance of the Alabama rule in Iowa. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1692 (3d ed. 1940); 
see Bowman v. ·woods, 1 Iowa 441 (1848). However, although not specifically over-
ruled, the case has not been followed by subsequent Iowa courts. See, e.g., Morton v. 
Equitable Life Ins. Co., 218 Iowa 846, 254 N.W. 325 (1934). 
4. Twelve states have statutes which purport to permit treatises as prima fade 
or presumptive evidence of "facts of general notoriety and interest" under varying 
circumstances. Eight of these statutory provisions are general in scope, e.g., IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 16-403 (1948) ("Historical works, books of science or art, and published 
maps or charts, made by persons indifferent between the parties, are prima facie 
evidence of facts of general notoriety and interest.'). See also ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 413 
(1960); IowA CODE ANN § 622.23 (1950); MONT. REv. CODE § 93-IIOl-8 (1947); NEB. 
REV. STAT, § 25-1218 (1943); ORE. REv. STAT. § 41.670 (1965); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-25-6 
(1953). Compare CAL. Evm. CODE § 1341 (West 1966) which provides that such treatises 
"are not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered to prove facts of general 
notoriety and interest." These statutes, owing to the qualifying clause "facts of 
general notoriety and interest," have, however, consistently been interpreted by the 
courts as not altering the common-law rule in the case of medical treatises. See, e.g., 
Eckleberry v. Kaiser Foundation N. Hosps., 226 Ore. 616, 359 P.2d 1090 (1961). 
Another four states have similar statutes, but these statutes are limited by their 
terms to certain categories of cases. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 233, § 79c (Supp. 1965) (mal-
practice suits); NEv. REv. STAT. § 51.040 (1963) (malpractice suits); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
31, § 700j-801 (1958) (milk pricing hearings); S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-142 (1962) (sanity 
hearings). Where this type of statute is involved, the courts have been more likely to 
permit medical treatises as direct evidence in derogation of the common law rule. 
See, e.g., Thomas v. Ellis, 329 Mass. 93, 106 N.E.2d 687 (1952). The application of such 
statutes, however, has been strictly confined to the cases specified in the statutes. See, 
e.g., Baker v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 161 S.C. 479, 159 S.E. 822 (1931). 
In addition, three jurisdictions have enacted the Uniform Rules of Evidence, which 
provide that: 
A published treatise, or periodical, or pamphlet on a subject of history, science 
or art [shall be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule] to prove tl1e truth 
of the matter stated therein if the judge takes judicial notice, or a witness expert 
in the subject testifies, that the treatise, periodical, or pamphlet is a reliable 
authority in the subject. 
UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 63(31); KANSAS GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-459(cc) (1964); c. z. 
CODE § 2962(31) (1963); V. I. CODE tit. 5 § 932(31) (1957); see 9A UNIFORM LAws 
ANNOTATED 591, 640 (1965). The Supreme Court of New Jersey, whose case law as 
recently as 1956 supported the majority medical treatise rule [Rutlt v. Fenchel, 21 N.J. 
171, 121 A.2d 373 (1956)], has adopted the Uniform Rules of Evidence almost without 
change as rules of court. N.J. SuP. CT. R. § 63(31) (1965). 
5. Professor McCormick defines hearsay as "testimony in court or written evidence 
of a statement made out of court, such statement being offered as an assertion to show 
the truth of the matter asserted •... " C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 225 (1954). Dean 
Wigmore characterizes "hearsay" as "extra-judicial testimonial assertions" which can-
not be admitted in evidence because the assertion is not made in court where it may 
be subjected to various "tests," chiefly cross-examination. 5 J. 1\TIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1361 
(3d ed. 1940). Under either verbalization, however, the primary rationale for exclusion 
is the same-the not insignificant possibility of unreliability. 
6. E.g., Piotrowski v. Corey Hosp., Inc., 172 Ohio St. 61, 173 N.E.2d 355 (1961); 
Hopkins v. Gromovsky, 198 Va. 389, 94 S.E.2d 190 (1956). See generally C. McCORMICK, 
EVIDENCE § 296 (1954); 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 718 (1964); 3 B. JONES, EVIDENCE § 621 (5tlt 
ed. 1958); A. MUNDO, THE EXPERT WITNESS 87-107 (1938); 6 J. 'WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 1691 
November 1967] Recent Developments 185 
matics or chemistry, however, are more likely to be admitted as 
direct evidence, the courts drawing a distinction between "exact 
sciences" and "inexact sciences," the latter being characterized by 
inductive reasoning. 7 
In the area of cross-examination most courts have permitted the 
use of medical treatises notwithstanding their hearsay nature. Thus, 
medical treatises may usually be introduced for the limited purposes 
of testing a witness' qualifications or impeaching his credibility, pro-
vided that certain preconditions are met.8 Some states, including 
Wisconsin prior to the principal case, hold that before a witness 
can be impeached by reference to a treatise he must be shown to 
have relied specifically on that particular treatise in giving his 
direct testimony.9 Other states relax the requirement and permit 
such cross-examination when the witness has relied on any treatise 
(lid ed. 1940); Annot., Medical Books or Treatises as Independent Evidence, 
65 A.L.R. 1102 (1930), 84 A.L.R.2d 1338 (1962). It has been held, however, that such 
treatises may be admitted upon consent of the parties. Goldthwaite v. Sheraton 
Restaurant, 154 Me. 214, 415 A.2d 362 (1958); cf. Eagleston v. Rowley, 172 F.2d 202 
(9th Cir. 1949). There is also some authority for the view that, notwithstanding the 
"no direct evidence" rule, counsel or an expert witness may read excerpts from a 
treatise to the jury. Most courts would not permit this, however, since it seems appar-
ent that such an exception would amount to an emasculation of the rule. See, e.g., 
Hopkins v. Gramovsky, supra. In Kaplan v. Mashkin Freight Lines, Inc., 146 Conn. 327, 
150 A.2d 602 (1959), however, plaintiff's counsel read such excerpts during his closing 
argument from a treatise which had been used in both direct and cross-examination of 
the medical witnesses. The court ruled such evidence inadmissible since the treatises 
themselves had not been admitted as evidence, but went on to state that the treatise 
could have been so introduced. Since this position would appear to be the outer 
possible limit short of forthrightly adopting the Alabama rule, it is not surprising 
that some confusion exists as to the Connecticut position. See Annot., Counsel's Right 
in Arguing Civil Case To Read Medical or Other Learned Treatises to the Jury, 72' 
A.L.R.2d 931 (1960). 
In the federal courts, FED. R. C1v. P. 43(a) provides that evidence admissible under 
United States statutes, federal equity rules "heretofore applied in the courts of the 
United States," or state rules of evidence shall be admitted, with the "rule which 
favors the reception" controlling. There is no provision in federal statute or equity 
rules for admitting such treatises, and thus, with the presumed exception of federal 
courts sitting in Alabama or one of the Uniform Rules jurisdictions, federal courts 
refuse to admit such evidence. E.g., Stottlemire v. Corwood, 215 F. Supp. 266 (D.D.C. 
1963). See generally, Orfield, Uniform Federal Rules of Evidence, 67 DICK L. REv. 
381 (1963). 
7. E.g., United States v. Two Cases of Chloro Naptholeum Disinfectant, 217 F. 477 
(D. Md. 1914) (chemistry book); Newman v. Blom, 249 Iowa 836, 89 N.W.2d 349 (1958) 
(actuarial table). See generally, Note, 46 IowA L. REV. 463 (1961); Note, 26 MARQ. L. 
REv. 43 (1941); Note, 19 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 353 (1934). 
8. As to rules governing the use of treatises in cross-examination, see 2 B. JoNES, 
EVIDENCE § 437 (5th ed. 1958); 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1700 (3d ed. 1940); Willens, 
Cross-Examining the Expert Witness With the Aid of Books, 41 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 
192 (1950); Comment, 12 S. CAL. L. REV. 424 (1939); Note, Medical Treatises as Evi-
dence-Helpful but too Strictly Limited, 29 U. CINc. L. REv. 255 (1960); Annot., Use 
of Medical or Other Scientific Treatises in Cross-Examination of Expert Witnesses, 60 
A.L.R.2d 77 (1958). 
9. See, e.g., Crowley v. Elgin, J. & E.R.R., 1 Ill. App. 2d 481, ll7 N.E.2d 843 (1954), 
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 927 (1955); Ross v. Foss, 77 S.D. 358, 92 N.W.2d 147 (1958). 
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or treatises in general in reaching his conclusion.10 A few states, yet 
more liberal, even permit impeachment by treatise on a showing, or 
on judicial notice, that the submitted treatise is "authoritative in 
its field."11 The most permissive approach, of course, is that which 
is exemplified by the prospective rule announced in the principal 
case. This approach results in completely exempting learned treatises 
from the proscriptions of the hearsay rule. Such a result may be 
justified on the basis of at least two of the rationales lying behind 
all exceptions to the hearsay rule: the material contained in the 
treatises may be deemed trustworthy and may be othenvise unavail-
able for exposition at trial. Nevertheless, most courts cling to the 
notion that learned treatises, being a form of hearsay evidence, must 
be tightly restricted in use. 
The courts' traditional wariness toward admitting the writings 
of learned medical authorities has, of course, not extended to hear-
ing the same expert testify on the same matters from the witness 
stand. The distinction lies primarily in the opportunity to confront 
and cross-examine the expert who is present in court.12 Confronta-
tion of a witness by the court and jury, it is argued, permits obser-
vation of his demeanor and bearing-both being important factors 
in weighing the worth of evidence. More crucial, the "test of fire" 
in cross-examination, which is the very heart of the adversarial 
process, serves to expose weaknesses and clarify the substance of the 
testimony. Thus, the expert's credibility and reliability are tested 
in the presence, and for the benefit, of the finder of fact. To these 
arguments for the general exclusion of all forms of hearsay, includ-
ing treatises, may be added the feeling that when the person whose 
assertion is to be submitted in evidence is not under oath, his 
personal trustworthiness is suspect.13 
10. The justification often given for this particular use of a treatise was well 
stated in the leading case of Reilly v. Pinirns, 338 U.S. 269, 275 (1949): 
It certainly is illogical, if not actually unfair, to permit witnesses to give expert 
opinion based on book knowledge and then deprive the party challenging such 
evidence of all opportunity to interrogate them about other leading books. 
Reilly, which dealt with the admissibility of medical treatises in the context of postal 
fraud, permits cross-examination using a treatise if the witness states that he has 
relied on any published work. See Note, 24 TuL. L. REv. 358 (1950). This rule is also 
followed in numerous state courts. See, e.g., Stone v. Proctor, 259 N.C. 633, 131 S.E.2d 
297 (1963); Dabroe v. Rhodes Co., 64 Wash. 431, 392 P.2d 317 (1964). 
11. In Darling v. Charleston Community Mem. Hosp., Judge Schaefer stated that: 
[Iln our opinion expert testimony will be a more effective tool in the attainment 
ot justice if cross-examination is permitted as to the views of recognized author-
ities, expressed in treatises, or periodicals written for professional colleagues. • • • 
The author's competence is established if the judge takes judicial notice of it, 
or if it is established by a witness expert in the subject. 
33 Ill. 2d 326, 336, 211 N.E.2d 253, 259 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966). 
12. C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 224 (1954); 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1362 (3d ed. 
1940). 
13. Id. Dean Wigmore views the oath as merely an adjunct to the primary protec-
tion of cross-examination since a statement made under oath but out of court, e.g., an 
affidavit, is "equally obnoxious to the hearsay rule." 
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Apart from these considerations, which apply to hearsay evidence 
in general, some commentators have urged other, more specific, 
rationales in support of the exclusion of affirmative evidence dra·wn 
from medical treatises.14 It is pointed out that the language of 
scientific journals, and medical journals in particular, is highly 
technical and would be difficult for a fact-finder unfamiliar with 
such material to understand. In addition, the treatise may be 
written imprecisely, and thus be of questionable evidentiary value: 
shades and nuances perhaps not important in the medical school 
classroom may assume monumental proportions in the courtroom. 
Moreover, in such an inductive discipline as medical theory, it is 
inevitable that there will be controversy on a fair number of im-
portant points, with eminently respectable schools of opinion on 
both sides of a question. Thus, the admission of treatises would 
simply lead to a "battle of the books," with each side marshalling 
impressive-looking lists of publications and authors. Furthermore, 
with the constant evolution and re-evaluation of medical theories 
and techniques, the mere passage of a few years' time may lead to 
modifications or reservations in the author's mind concerning what 
he had previously written. Thus, there is the risk that what is 
·written in the treatise is not the same as what the author would 
testify in court. Finally, it may be noted that "learned treatises" 
are almost never substantially based on the author's personal inves-
tigation and observation of the facts, but rather are usually a com-
pilation of a compilation-"hearsay upon hearsay." This multiple 
hearsay increases the probability of inaccurate and unreliable testi-
mony from a treatise. 
Most of the legal textwriters,15 led by Dean Wigmore and the 
drafters of the Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of 
Evidence,16 have criticized the majority "learned treatise" rule and 
Other considerations sometimes urged in support of the hearsay rule generally, such 
as the possibility that the out-of-court assertion may be inaccurately transcribed and 
testified to in court, do not seem applicable to the treatise question, since the material 
is in printed form and, unless the printer has erred, we know precisely what the 
author has "said." 
14. See c. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 296 (1954); 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1691 (3d 
ed. 1940); Dana, Admission of Learned Treatises in Evidence, 1945 Wis. L. REv. 455; 
Annot., .Medical Books or Treatises as Independent Evidence, 65 A.L.R. 1102 (1930) 
84 A.LR. 2d 1338 (1962). Compare Grubb, Proposed "Learned Treatise" Rule, 1946 
Wis. L. REv. 81. 
15. See C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 296, at 621 (1954); 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 
§ 1691, at 5 (3d ed. 1940); McCormick, Direct Examination of Medical Experts in 
Actions for Death and Bodily Injuries, 12 LA. L. REv. 264, 268 (1952). See also LADD, 
CAsES ON EVIDENCE 661 (2d ed. 1955). 
16. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE R. 529A (1942); UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE § 63(31) 
(1953); 9A UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED 591, 640 (1965). Uniform Rule § 63(31), adopted 
in three jurisdictions, is substantially identical to the older Model Code R. 529A 
which has not been adopted in any jurisdiction. See note 4 supra. However, the Model 
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urged the adoption of the contrary view. The primary purposes of 
confrontation and cross-examination, they point out, is to test the 
witness' qualifications, probe the consistency and truth of the testi-
mony presented, and bring out any information not adequately 
explored on direct examination. These purposes, it is urged, are 
not subverted by permitting medical treatises to be admitted as 
direct evidence. As regards the "witness' " qualification, the treatise 
may not even be considered unless the work is recognized by the 
profession and the court as authoritative.17 In addition, the author 
of such a treatise is subject to the detailed analysis and rebuttal of 
his colleagues in professional journals; thus, weaknesses in factual 
data or conclusions will be exposed. In this way, learned treatises 
are subjected to treatment which serves amply as a substitute for 
cross-examination. As to the requirement that a witness be under 
oath, other types of hearsay evidence not under oath have been 
freely admissible when it could be shown that there was no motive 
for, and little danger of, misrepresentation.18 Here, the scholarly 
author is intellectually committed to the search for truth; he has 
no motive to conceal or misrepresent for partisan purposes as he 
perhaps would on the witness stand. Moreover, the "intellectual 
cross-examination" of the scholarly process minimizes the danger 
that the treatise evidence will be untrustworthy. The problem of 
confusing the jury with the technical language of a medical treatise 
is simply met: a local expert might be called to interpret and explain 
the meaning and conclusions of the author. This, seemingly, would 
be the best of both worlds, since the research, reputation, and con-
clusions of the author would be made freely available to the fact-
finder in terms which he could understand. Guarding against the 
possibility of an inadequate or slanted interpretation of the work 
is, of course, the adversarial system itself. In addition, any reluctance 
of medical authorities to testify as to their own conclusions in a 
given case might be abated somewhat by requesting them merely 
to interpret another's opinion. Furthermore, concern about a "battle 
of the books" seems incongruous in the face of the present majority 
Code requires only that the "writer" be recognized as authoritative, whereas the 
Uniform Rules require that the "writing" itself be so recognized. 
17. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE § 63(31) specifies that as alternate conditions 
precedent to admissibility, a court may take judicial notice of the reliability of an 
authority or require that an expert in the field testify to the same effect. Alabama's 
practice is similar but may not provide for judicial notice. For example, in Smarr v. 
State, 260 Ala. 30, 36, 68 S.2d 6, 12 (1953), the court pointed out that treatises are 
"not in themselves self-proving, but are admissible only when recognized and approved 
by the medical profession as standard." 
18. E.g., statements made by a patient to his doctor concerning a presently existing 
physical condition are generally admissible, the theory being that the patient has a 
certain vested interest in his good health which he probably would not jeopardize by 
giving misleading statements to his doctor. C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 266 (1954); 
6 J. W1GMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1718-23 (3d ed. 1940). 
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rule which has led to a "battle of the experts."19 If competing 
theories exist, it may be more desirable that the "battle" take place 
on paper rather than in a personal confrontation. 
The opinion of the treatise ·writer, developed and recorded in 
the detached aerie of academe, is more likely to be presented ac-
curately to the court in ·written form than it would be if the 
presentation were made in the emotional atmosphere of litigation. 
Cross-examination may be a useful tool in determining the accuracy 
of a witness' testimony as to facts, but it may well distort an opinion 
based on scholarly research. The objection that the treatise author's 
own views may have changed since he ·wrote the book can be 
remedied effectively by opposing counsel's alert recognition of this 
possibility. Finally, the argument that the work may be merely a 
collection of the opinions of others and not based on the personal 
observations of the author ignores the fact that all such treatises 
must be recognized as authoritative by the profession before the 
trial judge can permit its introduction in evidence. In any event, 
the treatise is probably no worse than the expert witness himself, 
whose opinions are, presumably, at least partially based on what 
he learned from his medical school professors, textbooks, and 
professional journals. 
If these arguments are deemed to rebut the proposition that 
medical treatises are an unreliable source of direct evidence, then 
an argument can be made for admissibility based on the principle 
that all competent evidence, not otherwise excluded, pertaining to 
the issue at hand should be made available to and be considered by 
the fact-fi.nder.20 In addition, several more positive arguments can 
be made in support of the position prospectively adopted by the 
court in the principal case. First, it is less expensive to assemble 
books than experts, who may require travel fare, lodging, and meals 
in addition to their normal consultation fee. This lower cost benefits 
not only the particular litigant, but also broadens the scope of 
19. Although earlier writers conceded that there were problems in connection with 
the oral testimony of experts at trial, in the main they concluded that it is best "to 
let well enough alone." See Foster, Expert Testimon}~Prevalent Complaints and 
Proposed Remedies, 11 HARv. L. REv. 169, 185 (1897). See also, Rosenthal, The De-
velopment of the Use of Expert Testimony, 2 I.Aw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 403 (1935). How-
ever, in light of the growing complexity of personal injury actions as well as easier 
accessibility and transportation of experts to court, contemporary writers have recog-
nized that serious distortions to a fair trial may exist. Professor Morgan writes that 
"the abuse of expert opinion evidence in modern litigation .•• has become in many 
states a scandal, for the expert witness has become in truth an advocate for the party 
who presents him, rather than a witness." Morgan, Practical Difficulties Impeding 
Reform in the Law of Evidence, 14 VAND. L. REv. 725, 733 (1961) reprinted in EssAvs 
ON PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 3, 11 (Roady ed. 1961). 
20. As stated in I J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 10, at 293 (3d ed. 1940): "The second 
axiom on which our law of Evidence rests is this: All facts having rational probative 
value are admissible, unless some specific rule forbids." 
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sources available for consideration by the fact-finder. More im-
portant, it may be difficult or impossible to obtain testimony from 
a true "expert" if he happens to reside outside the jurisdiction.21 
It may be possible, of course, to obtain a deposition from the learned 
author, but this again entails added cost and inconvenience. The 
limitations of process and cost, then, may restrict the litigant to 
the services of the local expert, who, in certain fields at least, prob-
ably knows much of what he does about the subject through the 
very ·writings of the expert whose treatise is barred from evidence 
by the majority rule. Furthermore, in certain cases, unless the court 
admits treatises, there is a difficulty in obtaining any other type of 
medical testimony: reluctance and equivocation on the part of 
medical witnesses in certain suits often causes hardship for the 
plaintiff, who actually may have a meritorious cause of action.22 
Regrettably, except for a brief notation of this last argument, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the principal case did not discuss 
any of the conflicting considerations involved on either side of the 
question. Yet, although open to criticism for its methods in reach-
ing its conclusion, 23 the court took a bold departure from its prior 
precedents in adopting the Alabama rule. Indeed, so that no mistake 
could be made as to the scope of its ruling,24 the court pointed to 
21. See 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1691 (3d ed. 1940). 
22. In medical malpractice suits it is generally the rule that the plaintiff must 
obtain expert medical testimony-another physician-in order to maintain his 
burdens of proof as to the proper standard of care for the locality and the defendant's 
breach of that standard. If the plaintiff cannot obtain such medical testimony on 
his behalf, his cause of action will fail. See, e.g., Riley v. Layton, 329 F.2d 53 (10th 
Cir. 1964). See generally, 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 62(2) (1951). 
23. It would appear that the court, while enunciating a sound rule of law, mis-
read or misunderstood the state of existing precedent, for it stated that: "(w]hcrc 
the foundation is laid that the work is authoritative, recognized by the medical pro-
fession, and one which has influence on medical opinions, such works have now been 
admitted as independent evidence." Principal case at 509 (emphasis added). To the con-
trary, the only authority for this proposition cited by the court, 2 B. JONES, EVIDENCC 
§ 421 (Supp. 1964), indicates that: "[u]pon the direct examination of an c.xpert 
witness on medical science, extracts from treatises in that science which he states arc 
recognized by his profession as authoritative and which have influenced or tended to 
confirm his opinion may be used." [Citing Kaplan v. Mashkin Freight Lines, Inc., 146 
Conn. 327, 150 A.2d 602 (1959).] (Emphasis added.) To say that a treatise may be used 
on direct examination is not the equivalent of saying that it has now been admitted 
as independent evidence. In fact, Kaplan did not permit the introduction of medical 
treatises as independent evidence, but merely said that where there is a proper show-
ing that the treatise is a "recognized authority," counsel could use it in direct examina-
tion of his expert witness and read from it during the course of his closing argument. 
See note 6 supra. Furthermore, a glance at the topic heading in the Jones text reveals 
that the statement cited pertains to cross-examination of an expert witness, whereas 
the inadmissibility of treatises as "independent evidence" is postulated at 3 B. JONES, 
EVIDENCE § 621 (5th ed. 1958). 
24. One aspect of the case in particular detracts from its appropriateness as a lead-
ing precedent for the admissibility of medical treatises. Strictly speaking, the Guide 
here involved is not a treatise, but rather a committee-compiled pamphlet in the 
nature of a standard of measurement, a category more susceptible of admissibility than 
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and specifically adopted Rule 63(31) of the Uniform Rules of 
Evidence,:m which unequivocally permits introduction of treatises 
as direct, substantive evidence. In view of the reliability and trust-
worthiness of such treatises and the practical problems of obtaining 
qualified expert witnesses, the admission of such writings is not out 
of line with the policies behind allowing exceptions to the hear-
say rule. 
As in so many areas of the law, the question eventually comes 
down to a balancing of opposing interests-here, the justifiable 
suspicion of the reliability and trustworthiness of out-of-court state-
ments must be balanced against the desirability or necessity of 
having the most complete, competent evidence available before 
the fact-finder. While the value of cross-examination in open court 
as an instrument of ferreting out the truth and insuring reliability 
should not be understated, it seems that suspicions should be eased 
by taking into account the painstaking approach of the scholarly 
process. In any event, it is not entirely helpful to lump a carefully 
·written treatise in the same category as that of the eavesdropper 
or even that of the ordinary publication. In addition, it may still 
be noted that a considerable need exists for this sort of evidence. 
Supplementing the arguments already mentioned,26 is that plain 
fact that treatise evidence will often help the fact-finder to give 
due weight to expert testimony. Admittedly, even where a medical 
treatise is ·written in terms susceptible of comprehension by the 
jury, it seems unlikely that counsel would not seek to buttress 
his case with a live expert to tie the conclusions of the text to the 
specific facts at hand. Yet the mere presence of treatises, especially 
when they are in agreement, seems to make the standards used more 
objective and less likely to sway to the rhythms of litigation. In fact, 
it may be argued that those courts espousing the more liberal cross-
examination rules, including the United States Supreme Court,27 
must implicitly recognize that authoritative treatises have value as 
something more than merely a test for qualification or impeachment 
treatises. See, e.g., Mccomish v. De Soi, 42 N.J. 274, 282, 200 A.2d 116, 120-21 (1964). 
Another limiting factor is that the issue in the principal case arose in a cross-exami-
nation setting, not on direct examination. 
25. Principal case at 509. This approach of using a Uniform Rule as a source of 
common law may hold implications for the future of the Uniform Rules. While it 
was the intent of the drafters that the Rules should be adopted as a unified whole 
[see Commissioner's Prefatory Note, 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 503 (1965)], it 
may be that such piecemeal incorporation by reference will facilitate future adoption 
of the whole. See generally Orfield, Can Rules of Evidence Be Codified?, 42 N.D.L. 
REv. 13 (1965); Orfield, Uniform Federal Rules of Evidence, 67 DICK. L. REv. 381 
(1963); Swearingen, How the Adoption of the Uniform Rules of Evidence Woulcl 
Af]ect the Law of Evidence in Oregon: Rules 62-66, 42 ORE. L. REv. 200 (1963). 
26. See text accompanying notes 21 &: 22, supra. 
27. See note IO supra. 
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of the witness: when examination is permitted with the use of a 
treatise which was not specifically relied upon by the witness, the 
result, in effect, is to pit one authority against the other on almost 
equal terms. In reality, since it seems likely that a jury does not 
precisely fathom the distinction between introduction for impeach-
ment purposes and introduction for substantive purposes, it is but 
a "short evolutionary step"28 from the liberal cross-examination 
rules to the rule adopted in the principal case. 
28. See Swearingen, supra note 25, at 246. 
